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Preface 
 
The African Development Bank (AfDB) has partnered with the African Tax 
Administration Forum (ATAF) and the East African Secretariat on a project aimed 
at sharing lessons of experience from Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM) 
though case studies for the East African Community partner states (EAC), South 
Africa and South Korea. For the purposes of this work, DRM is defined to include 
only tax policy and administration and excludes other possible components of 
DRM such as domestic financial markets.   
 
The overall objective of this project is to make recommendations, for the 
participating countries of the EAC, on the priority reforms and ways to sequence 
and implement them, in order to significantly enhance DRM. As such, the primary 
beneficiaries of the project are both the Ministries of Finance and the Revenue 
Administrations of the EAC.  
 
This paper seeks to respond to the following question: What key factors have 
contributed to or inhibited DRM in South Korea? This case study has been 
prepared following an extensive review of available literature, interviews with 
individuals in South Korea, and the analysis of both primary and secondary data. 
Its development has also been informed by a methodological framework designed 
by the AfDB. The study adopts an explanatory case study approach to match 
patterns from our analysis of the literature and key informant interviews.  
 
The achievements and lessons of experience contained in this and other country 
case studies will provide primary inputs for a policy note.  The policy note will 
seek to address the following questions: What are the priority reforms for EAC 
partner states and the EAC? How should these reforms be sequenced and 
implemented?  
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Executive summary 
This case study explores some of the key achievements of Korea’s tax reforms during its takeoff phase 
between the 1960s and 1970s, with a view to drawing useful lessons for East Africa Community (EAC) 
member countries today. It is part of a broader Project on Domestic Resource Mobilization carried out 
by the   African Development Bank. This project aims at sharing best practices among EAC member 
countries. 
Korea’s development is one of the most successful and rapid in human history, yet during its takeoff 
phase, it was similar in many respects to EAC member countries today. Korea’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita grew from US$ 130 in 1954 to about US$ 19,115 in 2008. This growth was 
relatively well shared, as evidenced by a Gini coefficient of 32 in 2008 - equal to the European average. 
Korea implemented an export oriented infant industry strategy to transform itself from an 
underdeveloped country into a First World power in one generation. In the 60’s, Korea’s GDP per capita 
was similar to that of EAC member countries today and much lower than South Africa’s. Korea was a 
fragile state, emerging from a devastating war with North Korea. It was also predominantly rural, with a 
large informal sector, much like the profile of some of the countries in East Africa. This formed the 
rationale for including Korea’s tax experience during its takeoff phase in the Project. 
Tax reforms in the 60s and 70s consist in three phases which successively focused on: improving 
policies and laws, efficient implementation, and strengthening equity and introducing the Value 
Added Tax (VAT). First, until 1966, reforms focused on increasing revenue collection and supporting 
growth, mainly through revising tax policies. This involved for instance merging a number of taxes, 
increasing the share of indirect taxes and using tax incentives to support selected sectors. Growth 
increased and reached 9.3% in 1963, which was later sustained. But revenue collection still fell short of 
expectations. The focus, therefore, shifted from reforming policies to implementing them efficiently. 
Consequently, the second period, from 1966 to 1974, focused on strengthening the tax administration. 
The creation of the National Tax Service as a semi-autonomous body in 1966 initiated a period of rapid 
revenue growth. During the third period, from 1974 to 1980, the importance of equity as an objective of 
tax policy increased and the VAT was introduced. Korea’s tax reforms resulted in rapid revenue increase, 
from 9% of GDP in 1966 to 15% in 1980. Combined with a decrease in government expenditure, this 
enabled Korea to achieve fiscal balance, a priority strategic objective.   
Two lessons of particular relevance to EAC countries emerge from Korea’s tax experience. 
First, Korea achieved faster results by focusing its tax policies on a few priorities fully aligned with its 
national development strategy. In the 60s and 70s, Korea’s national strategy was on the one hand to 
rapidly achieve fiscal balance with a small government budget, and on the other hand to promote 
growth through an infant industry policy. However, trade-offs in the tax space were largely made up in 
other policy areas, for in particular through equity-oriented expenditure rural development programs 
and growth, which provided Korea with sustainable means to achieve equity. To this end, Korea 
successfully implemented tax policies focused on increasing revenues sufficiently to match low levels of 
expenditures by international standards, broadening the tax base, and providing incentives to strategic 
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sectors. In practice, less priority was given to other tax objectives, such as neutrality and equity. EAC 
countries are challenged by multiple tax objectives which can be conflicting if pursued at the same time. 
For instance exemptions can be necessary to provide safety nets or stimulate investments, but conflict 
with the objectives of broadening the tax base and minimizing distortions.  
Second, Korea broadened its tax base by making its tax administration both empowered and 
accountable. The National Tax Service (NTS) benefitted from full support by top Government officials. 
NTS was shielded from political interference in its operations, as illustrated from the President’s 
personal support to the Commissioner against external pressure. In addition, the enforcement capability 
of the tax administration was dramatically strengthened. For instance, three years after its creation, NTS 
staff headcount increased by 70% to reach 0.3 staff for 1000 inhabitants, 5 times the EAC average. On 
the other hand, the President was personally committed to the success of the tax administration, 
approving targets himself and closely monitoring performance. Operational empowerment and 
accountability for performance form a whole which together helped Korea succeed in broadening its tax 
base, as illustrated by a VAT Gross Compliance Ratio of 55% achieved by 1978, against 32% on average 
in the EAC today.   
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 This case study explores some of the key achievements of Korea’s tax reforms 
during its takeoff phase in the 1960s and 1970s, with a view to understanding 
what policy and administrative means Korea undertook, which contributed to 
its successful development and drawing useful lessons for EAC member 
countries today. 
 
1.2 This case study is part of a broader study on Domestic Resource Mobilization 
carried out by the African Development Bank. This Project aims at sharing best 
practices among East African Community member countries based on the 
experiences of South Africa and South Korea. As part of this Project,  case studies 
or summary reports were prepared for each of the countries in the project 
(Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, South Korea). The 
Project also included a study tour of Korea‟s tax system and history which took 
place in November 2009, which provided Korean and East African tax officials an 
opportunity to exchange views on their respective experiences. The objective of 
the comparative study is to draw lessons from the case studies, summary papers 
and study tour is to distill policy recommendations for East African countries. 
South Korea is included in the project in order to put East African experiences in 
perspective with that of a country, which faced most of the challenges presently 
faced by East African countries today, but which was able to use mobilize 
domestic resource to successfully further national development objectives.   
 
1.3 South Korea‟s development is one of the most successful in human history, and 
yet it faced in the 1960s many of the challenges that many African countries still 
face today including, inter alia,  (i) heavy reliance on foreign aid, (ii) an agrarian 
sector dominated by an informal economy, (iii)  limited capacity of fiscal 
administration, and low tax base.  In the 1960‟s, Korea‟s GDP per capita was 
similar to that of EAC member countries today and much lower than South 
Africa‟s. Korea was a fragile state, emerging from a devastating war with North 
Korea. It was also predominantly rural, with a large informal sector. Korea‟s GDP 
per capita grew from US$ 130 in 1954 to about US$ 19,115 in 2008. At the same 
time, Korea was able to ensure this economic growth was well shared, as 
evidenced   by a Gini coefficient of 32 in 2008 - equal to the European average. 
Korea implemented an export oriented infant industry strategy to transform itself 
from an underdeveloped country into a First World power in one generation. In the 
9 
 
process, it also managed to undertake tax reforms that led to rapid tax revenue 
growth. 
1.4 This case study also focuses on domestic and central taxes. Customs taxes are not 
covered in detail because the integration process of the EAC and international 
trade agreements will result in a reduction of the importance of customs taxes in 
the revenue composition of EAC countries. In addition, local taxes are not 
discussed because they remained at relatively low levels in Korea during the 1960s 
and 1970s, the focus period of this study, and very little research material seems 
1
available on this. However, basic information on these taxes and on their 
contribution to total revenues is provided as part of the background for domestic 
and central taxes. 
 
1.5 The case study is structured around three parts. Chapter two provides the  
“Background and context” presenting Korea‟s development since the end of the 
Korean War in 1953, and discusses the comparability of Korea during its takeoff 
and the EAC today. Chapter three focuses on Korea‟s tax reforms over time with a 
discussion on each phase of the country‟s tax policies and administrative reforms. 
Chapter four discusses the key lessons that can be learned from South Korea‟s 
experience which could be of guidance to EAC countries. 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 It is important to emphasize that Korea’s tax experience in the 1960’s and 1970’s is in general poorly documented. Most of 
the data used in this case study was actually produced by the National Tax Service, created in 1966. It took many years for NTS 
to produce comprehensive and consistent data sets. Much of the data used in this study is the result of a reconciliation and 
cross-checking of various sources. Some discrepancies could not be fully resolved. There was therefore also extensive use of 
qualitative information collected from the literature - mostly Korean - to check and complement the quantitative evidence 
available. Some uncertainty will therefore remain on the details presented in this paper.  Nevertheless, the main findings of this 
study do emerge quite clearly from the evidence available. 
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2 Background 
2.1 Korea’s development experience and strategy 
2.1.1. This section presents Korea‟s development since the end of the Korean War in 
1953 until today, and provides a comparison of Korea during its takeoff with 
EAC today.  Though the focus of this study is the takeoff period, this section 
provides an overview of Korea‟s development until today. Indeed, this is 
necessary to understand the long term consequences of the tax reforms during 
the takeoff period. 
2.1.2. From 1962 to 2008, Korea‟s real GDP grew at an impressive rate of 7.2% on 
average, while achieving remarkable equity and social development. Korea‟s 
GDP per capita grew from US$ 130 in 1954 to about US$ 19,115 in 2008 ( 
2.1.3.  
2.1.4. Figure 1: 50 years of growth in Korea 
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2.1.5. Following the Korean War, the military Government adopted an import 
substitution policy which did not result in significant growth. The import 
substitution policy was to a large extent devised to address the fiscal and 
current account deficits, which as a result, were widening.. The United States 
was the main provider of aid to Korea. Aid, until 1958, accounted for up to 
45% of Government revenues and financed 70% of imports. In 1957, the US 
unexpectedly announced that it was phasing out its development assistance, 
which effectively started to decline from 1958.  
2.1.6. In 1961, a military coup brought Park Chung Hee to power. He changed the 
country‟s national development policy from import substitution to export 
promotion based on the aspiration for national autonomy. His slogan was 
“From Poverty to Self-sufficiency”. In order to design and implement this 
policy, President Park created a number of institutions, including the Economic 
Planning Board, established in July 1961 with the mission to develop 5-year 
Economic Development Plans (EDP), including both macroeconomic planning 
and detailed implementation plans. In addition, the Korea Trade Investment 
Promotion Agency was created which, among its responsibilities, included 
reporting progress on export targets directly to the President on a monthly 
basis. 
2.1.7. The export strategy resulted in rapid growth in the 1960‟s and 1970‟s. It relied 
on intensive government intervention to protect and promote private 
investment in infant industries in selected sectors. Indeed, the Government 
considered that Korean industries had not reached the critical mass to be able 
to compete on international markets and therefore required protection as 
economies of scale were being built. Government intervention took many 
forms, in which tax incentives played a role. However, the central focus of 
government intervention was in financial markets. The support system 
included placing the Central Bank under the authority of the Government, 
nationalizing banks, proscribing lending objectives to the banks by sector, 
controlling interest rates, subsidizing credit and providing government 
guarantees. Other measures included: foreign exchange control - in particular 
the 1964 devaluation, pooled marketing boards - which in particular purchased 
imported inputs in bulk for Korean Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), 
selection of high potential SMEs for special support and close government 
performance monitoring, capacity building for SMEs, and overhauling the 
education system to supply skilled labor to the priority industries.  
2.1.8. The first two EDPs, covering the 1962-1971 period focused on manufacturing 
exports, such as steel, machinery, and chemical industries. Basic inputs for 
production were also emphasized, such as coal, electricity, fertilizers, oil 
refining, synthetic fibers, and cement. The third and fourth EDPs focused on 
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higher value added and heavy industry exports, including household 
electronics, cars, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals. 
2.1.9. By the end of the 70s however, the distortions cumulated over 20 years of 
strong government interventions in the financial and labor markets had become 
unsustainable. In particular, some industries were suffering overinvestment and 
excess capacity. The wage of skilled labor increased very rapidly, up to 31% 
per year from 1974 to 1980. This along with the creation of rents in priority 
sectors, caused growing inequalities. This was aggravated by a persistent high 
inflation, which started with the first oil shock in 1973. Political opposition 
rised and culminated in the assassination of President Park in October 1979. 
After a brief political interregnum, General Chun Doo Hwan came to power 
through a coup. 
2.1.10. In 1980, the change of regime, combined with the economic crisis, led to a 
shift from  high government intervention to a liberalization policy. As General 
Chun took power the second oil crisis hit Korea, making a tight stabilization 
policy even more urgent. It was based on zero-based budgeting, including a 
freeze of public wages and a monetary squeeze. As a result, inflation declined 
from 21% to 2% during 1981-1984. In addition, the financial sector was 
rapidly liberalized, with four of the five largest banks being privatized, two 
commercial banks being created, along with many other private financial 
institutions, and government credit control progressively phased out. The 
Banking Act was amended to prevent Chaebols from owning excessive shares 
in financial institutions.  
2.1.11. By 1986, Korea had resumed high rates of growth. It was in particular 
benefiting from a low dollar and low oil prices. Its current account surpluses 
reached 8%. Liberalization continued, with direct investment by foreigners in 
the Korean stock market being allowed from 1992 and Korea joining the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994 and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996. The liberalization was 
considered succcessful until the financial crisis Korea in 1997 and international 
financial flows abruptly reverted. Identifying the root causes of the crisis is 
difficult as both pro and anti liberal interpretations of the Asian financial crisis 
can be found. However, there is a broader agreement that over-investment by 
the Chaebols and excessive maturity mismatches in financial institutions were 
some of the key reasons for the rapid loss of investor confidence. Korea‟s 
economy grew a little above 4% as a result of the crisis, which was very low 
compared to Korea‟s 8% average growth from 1962 to 1997. It has since 
recovered and grown at an average of 6.2% from 1999 to 2007. The 2008 
financial crisis took a heavy toll on Korea, causing growth the decline to 2.2% 
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that year. Korea has since benefited from a steady recovery, in line with the 
faster growth of the global economy. 
2.1.12. ). Korea‟s Gini index was 32 in 2008 - equal to the European average – 
reflecting the success of the model in mitigating the risk of high inequality 
despite rapid growth. Social indicators are also positive. For instance, life 
expectancy increased from 55 to 79 years from 1962 to 2008. Secondary 
school enrollment increased from 42% in 1971 to 98% today. 
 
Figure 1: 50 years of growth in Korea 
 
 
2.1.13. Following the Korean War, the military Government adopted an import 
substitution policy which did not result in significant growth. The import 
substitution policy was to a large extent devised to address the fiscal and 
current account deficits, which as a result, were widening.. The United States 
was the main provider of aid to Korea. Aid, until 1958, accounted for up to 
45% of Government revenues and financed 70% of imports. In 1957, the US 
unexpectedly announced that it was phasing out its development assistance, 
which effectively started to decline from 1958.  
2.1.14. In 1961, a military coup brought Park Chung Hee to power. He changed the 
country‟s national development policy from import substitution to export 
promotion based on the aspiration for national autonomy. His slogan was 
“From Poverty to Self-sufficiency”. In order to design and implement this 
policy, President Park created a number of institutions, including the Economic 
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Planning Board, established in July 1961 with the mission to develop 5-year 
Economic Development Plans (EDP), including both macroeconomic planning 
and detailed implementation plans. In addition, the Korea Trade Investment 
Promotion Agency was created which, among its responsibilities, included 
reporting progress on export targets directly to the President on a monthly 
basis.
2
 
2.1.15. The export strategy resulted in rapid growth in the 1960‟s and 1970‟s. It relied 
on intensive government intervention to protect and promote private 
investment in infant industries in selected sectors. Indeed, the Government 
considered that Korean industries had not reached the critical mass to be able 
to compete on international markets and therefore required protection as 
economies of scale were being built. Government intervention took many 
forms, in which tax incentives played a role. However, the central focus of 
government intervention was in financial markets. The support system 
included placing the Central Bank under the authority of the Government, 
nationalizing banks, proscribing lending objectives to the banks by sector, 
controlling interest rates, subsidizing credit and providing government 
guarantees. Other measures included: foreign exchange control - in particular 
the 1964 devaluation, pooled marketing boards - which in particular purchased 
imported inputs in bulk for Korean Small and Medium Enterprises (SME), 
selection of high potential SMEs for special support and close government 
performance monitoring, capacity building for SMEs, and overhauling the 
education system to supply skilled labor to the priority industries.  
2.1.16. The first two EDPs, covering the 1962-1971 period focused on manufacturing 
exports, such as steel, machinery, and chemical industries. Basic inputs for 
production were also emphasized, such as coal, electricity, fertilizers, oil 
refining, synthetic fibers, and cement. The third and fourth EDPs focused on 
higher value added and heavy industry exports, including household 
electronics, cars, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals. 
2.1.17. By the end of the 70s however, the distortions cumulated over 20 years of 
strong government interventions in the financial and labor markets had become 
unsustainable. In particular, some industries were suffering overinvestment and 
excess capacity. The wage of skilled labor increased very rapidly, up to 31% 
per year from 1974 to 1980. This along with the creation of rents in priority 
sectors, caused growing inequalities. This was aggravated by a persistent high 
inflation, which started with the first oil shock in 1973. Political opposition 
rised and culminated in the assassination of President Park in October 1979. 
After a brief political interregnum, General Chun Doo Hwan came to power 
through a coup. 
                                                          
2
 Interestingly, ambassadors were also given sales objectives and were assessed on this basis. 
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2.1.18. In 1980, the change of regime, combined with the economic crisis, led to a 
shift from  high government intervention to a liberalization policy. As General 
Chun took power the second oil crisis hit Korea, making a tight stabilization 
policy even more urgent. It was based on zero-based budgeting, including a 
freeze of public wages and a monetary squeeze. As a result, inflation declined 
from 21% to 2% during 1981-1984. In addition, the financial sector was 
rapidly liberalized, with four of the five largest banks being privatized, two 
commercial banks being created, along with many other private financial 
institutions, and government credit control progressively phased out. The 
Banking Act was amended to prevent Chaebols
3
 from owning excessive shares 
in financial institutions.  
2.1.19. By 1986, Korea had resumed high rates of growth. It was in particular 
benefiting from a low dollar and low oil prices. Its current account surpluses 
reached 8%. Liberalization continued, with direct investment by foreigners in 
the Korean stock market being allowed from 1992 and Korea joining the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994 and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996. The liberalization was 
considered succcessful until the financial crisis Korea in 1997 and international 
financial flows abruptly reverted. Identifying the root causes of the crisis is 
difficult as both pro and anti liberal interpretations of the Asian financial crisis 
can be found. However, there is a broader agreement that over-investment by 
the Chaebols and excessive maturity mismatches in financial institutions were 
some of the key reasons for the rapid loss of investor confidence. Korea‟s 
economy grew a little above 4% as a result of the crisis, which was very low 
compared to Korea‟s 8% average growth from 1962 to 1997. It has since 
recovered and grown at an average of 6.2% from 1999 to 2007. The 2008 
financial crisis took a heavy toll on Korea, causing growth the decline to 2.2% 
that year. Korea has since benefited from a steady recovery, in line with the 
faster growth of the global economy. 
2.2 Comparing Korea in the 60s/70s and the EAC today4 
2.2.1 In addition, this study focuses on Korea in the 60s/70s because it was then similar 
to EAC member countries in many respects.  Korea was a post-conflict country 
emerging from the Korean War and was threatened of invasion from the North. 
Similarly, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda have suffered from armed conflicts 
which have been followed by continued tensions.  
                                                          
3
 Chaebols are large family-owned Korean business conglomerates which benefitted from strong government 
support to become powerful multinationals. There are several dozen Chaebols, including well known brands such as 
Samsung, Hyundai and LG. 
4
 For discussions on the specificities of Korea‟s initial conditions and their implication on the replicability of its 
approach to development have discussed extensively. Examples can be found in the “Korea‟s Development 
experience” section of the list of references in annexes. 
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2.2.2 Korea in the 1960s was in the same income group as the EAC today. After 
adjusting for inflation and purchasing power parity (constant 2005 US$ at PPP
 
)
5
, 
Korea‟s GDP per capita in 1962 was $US 1849. From 1954 until 1968, Korea‟s 
budget (excluding grant revenues) and current account were in chronic deficit (for 
instance 6% and 12% of GDP in 1962 respectively). These deficits were largely 
financed by grants from the US. Korea‟s economic structure, like the EAC today, 
comprised a large agrarian sector, but was less industrialized and had lower levels 
of trade. Agriculture contributed to 36% of GDP in 1962, against 30% in the EAC 
in 2005
6
. Industrial output contributed to only 17% of GDP in 1962, against 26% 
in the EAC in 2005
7
. In addition, the level of trade (exports + imports) in Korea 
was 21% of GDP in 1962, against 59% in EAC in 2007
8
. 
2.2.3 Differences emerge on social dimensions. Health indicators were similar, but 
education levels were much higher. Life expectancy was 55 years in 1962, against 
54 in the EAC in 2007
9
. However, gross secondary school enrollment was 42% in 
1971
10
, against 35% in the EAC in 2007
11
. 
2.2.4 Moreover, Koreans had developed a culture of tax evasion, which became 
widespread under the Japanese occupation as a form of resistance, but 
continued after the end of the colonization. Notwithstanding this reality, the 
situation after the Korean War was more complex.  Korea had a tradition of 
centralized government was centuries old. Taxation systems, from the Three 
Kingdoms Era dating back from 54 BC, had evolved into advanced systems of 
delegation of powers to, and control of, the local level. This system was 
severely affected by the Japanese colonization and the Korean War. However, 
it would be fair to assume that institutions that were centuries old were able 
to survive to some extent and provide a starting base for a new Government, 
including the tax administration.  In addition, during the takeoff phase, Korea 
was united by national sentiment, carried by a relatively united people and 
fueled with an urge to catch up with Japan, which helped create a culture of 
tax adherence and national savings. 
                                                          
5
 The benchmark year 2005 was chosen as a reference year in this section because the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database – our main source for PPP GDP at constant value - PPP exchange rates are available for this year only. In interpreting 
these PPP and inflation adjusted figures, one should bear in mind that inflation adjustments over long periods of time – here five 
decades – are subject to significant inaccuracies, especially when the structure of economies have changed significantly, as it is 
the case for Korea. Inaccuracies are caused in particular by the significant changes which occur over long periods in the basket of 
reference goods and services used to calculate inflation. 
6
 WDI, data missing for some EAC countries after 2005 
7
 WDI, data missing for some EAC countries after 2005 
8
 WDI, data missing for some EAC countries after 2007 
9
 WDI, population-weighted average, data missing for some EAC countries after 2007 
10
 WDI. No data is available before 1971, and no other education than secondary school enrollment indicator could 
be found. 
11
 WDI, population-weighted average, data missing for some EAC countries after 2007 
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2.2.5 The global environment in several respects was more favorable than it is 
today. Global demand was strong and trade growing rapidly. International 
competition was not as fierce as today and Korea could better take advantage 
of its low wages than Africa today, which is competing with China and India. 
Korea was not bound by many trade agreements or regional tariff structure 
as many African countries are today, and therefore had much more freedom 
to negotiate its trade policies.  On the other hand, many African countries can 
benefit from increasingly integrated regional markets, offering markets that 
are significantly larger than the domestic market of Korea at the time.  
Importantly, the digital revolution is offering African countries many 
opportunities to increase productivity, including in the taxation area, that 
Korea did not have at the time. 
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3 Korea’s tax experience 
3.1 Overview 
3.1.1 In this section, Korea‟s tax reforms are set out chronologically, presenting at each 
phase policies and administrative reforms. This section is mostly descriptive, 
while the analysis is developed in section 4. It starts with an overview, followed 
with a detailed presentation by sub-period, focusing on the takeoff period – 1960s 
and 1970s. However, some basic information on Korea‟s taxation from the 1980s 
to today is also provided, to the extent it helps understand the reforms of the 
takeoff period as part of a longer term sequence of reforms. 
3.1.2 The beginning of Korea‟s modern tax system is often dated back to 1948, when 
North and South Korea were separated. However, a major disruption occurred 
with the Korean War (1950-1953), which brought a special tax system designed to 
finance the war mainly relying on land taxation. Because the tax system created in 
1948 did not have the time to mature until the end of the war in 1953, this 
overview starts from 1953. 
3.1.3 The history of Korea‟s taxation can be broken down into two periods which mirror 
the economic policies at the time: 
 1953-1980 Fiscal balance and growth 
 1980-present Allocative efficiency and equity 
 
3.1.4 During the fiscal balance and growth period, after a slow start until 1962, Korea‟s 
economy and tax revenues grew tremendously. Between 1953 and 1962, the focus 
was on moving from a war to a civilian tax system and increasing Government 
revenues. However, central tax revenues remained volatile around an average of 7 
to 8% of GDP. In 1962, one year after President Park Chung Hee took power, and 
as part of the first Five Year Economic Development Plan, the first comprehensive 
tax reform was undertaken, with tax considered for the first time as an important 
tool to stimulate growth. 1966 is another major milestone, as the National Tax 
Service (NTS)
12
 was created as an independent administration in charge of 
collecting taxes. In 1970, the Korea Customs Service (KCS) was also established 
as an independent organization, with the mission to collect tariffs but also to 
provide first class services in response to growing trade volumes. The creation of 
NTS marked the beginning of a rapid growth in revenues. From then, central tax 
revenues increased dramatically from 9% to reach around 15% in 1980 (7% to 
11% for domestic taxes alone). Over the same period, government expenditures 
were reduced from an average of 20% of GDP to 15%, achieving fiscal balance. 
                                                          
12
 At first, it was called the Office of the National Tax Administration (ONTA) and then the National Tax 
Administration (NTA). 
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As inflation started to increase following the 1973 oil crisis, equity measures were 
introduced in 1974, including tax-based safety nets and the comprehensive income 
tax. Equity measures were then improved and mainstreamed during from the 
1980s. Importantly, VAT was introduced in 1976.  
3.1.5 From 1980, along with the national strategy, tax policies shifted to liberalization in 
order to minimize distortions and ensure equity. Taxes became more neutral and 
the focus was on maintaining fiscal balance and further broadening the tax base by 
curtailing exemptions, and equity. 
 
Figure 2: Central tax revenues and expenditures over the past 50 years 
 
Source: MOSF, NTS, WDI, calculations by the authors 
 
3.1.6 An analysis of the composition of tax revenues shows that Korea has heavily 
relied on indirect taxes, significantly more than international benchmarks. Indirect 
taxes progressively increased from about 45 to 55% of total taxes, against an 
average of 32% in OECD countries in 2005
13
. The progressive increase of the 
share of indirect taxes was initiated in 1960, during the so-called tax reforms of 
the Democratic Party. The thinking then was that in a low income country, indirect 
taxes were easier to collect. 
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Graph 1: Breakdown of central taxes 
 
Source: NTS, calculations by the authors 
 
3.1.7 Second, customs taxes were designed to promote strategic export sectors during 
the 1960s/1970s, and dramatically reduced from the 1980s as a result of the 
liberalization of the economy. Customs revenue was consistently just below about 
30% of central government revenues from the 1960s through the 1970s and until 
about the mid-80s. During the takeoff period of the economy, in order to support 
infant industries, import tariffs were removed or significantly reduced on imports 
of inputs to key and strategic industries. Similarly, export tariffs were reduced for 
exports of the same industries. Furthermore, import tariffs were raised to protect 
the domestic market from foreign competitors in the priority industries. The 
reduction in customs taxes in the mid-1980s was driven by the liberalization of 
trade. From about the mid-80s, customs revenue has fallen as a share of total 
central government revenue to about 8%. This resulted from reductions in customs 
tax rates. Direct taxes increased from 1989 to compensate for the loss in customs 
tax revenues. This increase was largely driven by two reforms. A more 
comprehensive income tax system was introduced, including financial revenues. 
In addition, the Government introduced taxes on real estate gains in 1990 in order 
to curb rising speculation.  
3.1.8 Measures to improve the performance of customs taxes and local taxes are not 
discussed further in this paper. Customs taxes are not covered in detail because the 
integration process of the EAC and international trade agreements results in a 
reduction of the importance of customs taxes in the revenue composition of EAC 
countries. In addition, local taxes are not discussed because they remained at 
relatively low levels during the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, up until 1987, the share 
of local taxes was consistently around 10% of total taxes (1% of GDP). However, 
it is worthwhile noting that local taxes have played an increasing role in financing 
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public services from the 1980s
14
. The basic information provided above aimed at 
giving a sense of the relative contribution central domestic taxes to total revenues. 
3.2 1953-66: Improving policies and laws 
3.2.1 From 1953 to 1966, the central objective was to increase tax revenues and promote 
export-led growth. Following the end of the Korean War, attempts to increase tax 
revenues took many different forms. New taxes were introduced, such as the 
Education tax (a surtax on income tax), the asset revaluation tax and the foreign 
exchange tax in 1958. It is in 1960 that the strategy to raise indirect tax rates and 
reduce direct taxes was introduced for the first time, as indirect taxes were 
considered easier to collect in a poor country with a large informal sector. This 
resulted in indirect taxes contributing a prominent share of the tax revenues in 
Korea, a feature that still prevails today. 
3.2.2 For the first time during this period, tax incentives aiming at supporting growth 
were introduced. In 1960, tax exemptions were introduced to support export, 
investment and SMEs in key industries. For instance, a 30% corporate tax rate 
exemption was granted to export businesses. It is however only in 1961, when 
President Park Chung Hee took power, that tax incentives for growth took a truly 
central role. President Park created the Economic Planning Board, in charge of 
defining 5-year Economic Development Plans (EDP). Tax reforms, as all the other 
policy tools were integrated in the EDPs and designed to achieve its goals. The 
first 5 year EDP focused on export manufacturing. As a consequence, 10 tax laws 
were revised to introduce a complete system of incentives. It included a drastic 
reduction of the taxation of capital, tariffs on inputs, and income in “Key and 
strategic industries” and export industries. A 50% exemption on income tax was 
granted to all foreign exchange earning businesses. Machinery and equipment 
directly employed for foreign exchange earning activities benefited from a special 
depreciation at rates 30% higher than the standard rates. Tax on interest income 
was close to zero to encourage savings. In addition, corporate taxes were greater 
for open listed companies than for closely held companies, to increase investment 
                                                          
14 In 1988 the share of local taxes to total taxes suddenly increased to about 14%, to progressively reach just over 
20% of total taxes in 2006 (5% of GDP) (Choi, 2008). This can be compared to the average of the share of local 
taxes in other OECD countries, which is 13.8% (Kim, 2005). The suddenly increase in 1987 was driven by a new 
excessive land holding tax to help curb land speculation, and which was administrated locally. In 1989 this ratio 
then increased to around 20%, due the tobacco sales tax being changed from a national to local tax. This seems to 
have been part of the preparations, in 1989, for an election campaign, whereby the tobacco sales tax was changed 
to a local tax in order to become a major source of revenue for local governments. This has indeed been the case, 
with the reallocation of the tobacco tax providing local governments with an additional 39.8% of tax revenues in 
1989 (Choi & Hyun, 1997). 
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opportunities through capital markets. Box 1 provides an overview of tax 
incentives used by Korea and of some of their improvements over time. 
3.2.3 The Park Administration also introduced a number of reforms aimed at improving 
administrative efficiency. There were attempts to simplify the tax administration - 
such as absorbing the textile tax into the commodity tax in 1953, streamline the 
functioning of regional tax offices, and tax officials were screened to keep the best 
performing staff. 
 
Box 1: Summary of tax incentives during the takeoff phase and continuous improvement 
 
3.2.4 Though growth did start in 1963, with a growth rate of 9.3% which was later 
sustained, tax revenue performance fell short of expectations, remaining at around 
 
 
Though the incentives introduced in the early 60s remained the same throughout Korea’s takeoff phase, their 
design was improved frequently until the liberalization period, in part to address issues with firms abusing these 
preferential treatments. In trying to learn from Korea’s experience, it is therefore important to understand the 
reasons for the changes in the design of incentives and make sure that mistakes are not repeated. We highlight 
here three changes in the design of tax incentives that are particularly insightful. 
First, in 1967, the accelerated depreciation incentive was improved to provide benefits that are proportional to 
the actual share of exports in a company’s sales. Indeed, export companies would initially qualify for accelerated 
depreciation, regardless of how much they would export. This resulted in abuses, with companies registering as 
exporters even with very small shares of exports. Making the extent of the accelerated depreciation proportional 
to the share of exports solved his issue. 
Second, in 1974, key and strategic industries were given the choice between three types of incentives: tax 
holidays, investment tax credit, and special depreciation. Tax holidays consisted in 100% exemption over the first 
3 years, then 50% for two years. The investment tax credit was 8% on foreign capital goods, 10% on domestic 
capital goods. A special depreciation on 100% of asset value was also offered. This was decided after a decade of 
trying different tax incentives. This approach was probably a clever way to let the market choose what incentive 
was best for each type of industry, rather than the government trying to guess so. 
Third, again in 1974, all incentives were unified under one law: “Tax exemption and reduction control law". This 
was probably a way to improve the transparency of the incentive system, and hence eliminate duplications and 
reduce abuses. 
 
Summary of tax incentives for growth
Incentive Effect
Incentives to icnrease savings Reduced tax on interest, dividends and capital gains Increases returns from savings
Special Consumption Tax on luxury goods Reduces the opportunity cost of saving
Reduced income tax on listed companies Increases the demand for savings hence interest rates
Greater share of consumption tax in the tax mix Increases the cost of consumption
Incentives to increase investment in priority sectors Income tax reduction Increases Return On Investment (ROI)
VAT exemption on export products Increases ROI
Accelerated depreciation Increases ROI
Investment tax credit Increases ROI
Reduced taxes on inputs for export industries Increases ROI
Source: consolidated by the authors from various sources
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7% of GDP. The Park administration analyzed the reasons for the failure which 
led them, from 1966, to refocus their approach from tax policy reforms to their 
implementation.  
3.3 1966-74: Focusing on implementation 
Tax incentives continued to be used extensively during this period and the 
following one (chapter 3.4). But they are not developed further because, as most 
other policies, they did not change in nature following their creation during the 
first 5-year EDPs. Most tax incentives were introduced in the previous EDP
15
. The 
subsequent changes only concerned the sectors to which they applied and the rates 
of exemptions, reflecting changes in the sectors which were given priority. In 
addition, their design was improved. These improvements have been summarized 
in Box 1. 
The key reform of this period was the establishment in 1966 of the National Tax 
Service (NTS, called Office of National Taxation at the time) in order to 
dramatically reinforce tax administration. NTS was created as an independent 
government agency, with the mission to assess and collect direct and indirect 
central domestic taxes. Before its creation, these functions were carried out by the 
Tax Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. The Tax Bureau remained responsible for 
formulating tax policies and drafting tax laws. 
Many analysts interpreted the disappointing performance of the previous policy-
focused reforms as a result of weak implementation and recommended the 
creation of a tax administration with strong capacity. After significant tax reforms 
in 1961, a comprehensive tax reform in 1962 and numerous other tax reforms until 
1965 tax revenues grew less than the economy and remained very volatile. In 
1954, the Nathan Report on tax policy suggested that the improvements in tax 
investigation and collection would be imperative to increase tax revenues (KDB, 
1954). In 1964, the Economic Planning Bureau (EPB) recommended the creation 
of an independent tax agency. In 1965, during his mission to Korea as a member 
of the Nathan economic advisor, R.A. Musgrave from Harvard University also 
emphasized the need to establish a tax agency focused on fighting tax evasion 
(NTS, 1986). 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 One exception is the investment tax credit which was introduced in 1968. 
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Subsequently, President Park formed a Special Investigation Team, with the 
mission to assess the potential revenue increase from a fully capacitated 
administration. The team was created in September 1965. It was led by a secretary 
reporting directly to him (Mr. Lee, Nak-Sun). It comprised 12 staff from the office 
of the President (the Blue House), the Board of Audit and Inspection and the 
prosecution service. It was an excellent combination of political leadership, 
professional expertise and investigation power. The President entrusted the team 
with full powers to conduct tax investigation, and provided the team leader with a 
mission letter saying: “all executive and investigating authorities as well as all 
chiefs of state and local government agencies must comply with the team's 
requests related to its duty.” (KIPF, 1997). 
The results of the investigation convinced President Park of the benefits of 
creating the National Tax Service. The Special Investigation Team decided to 
focus on the textile industry as an example. It was chosen because of its complex 
value chain, which provided a many opportunities for tax evasion. By the end of 
the year, the Special Investigation Team had uncovered tax evasions worth US$ 
9.3 million in this industry only. Though the investigations concerned a small 
fraction of the economy only, the amount of evasion uncovered was very 
substantial, at almost 5% of the total tax revenues collected in 1965 (US$ 205 
million). The President was satisfied that these results proved that tax revenues 
could increase substantially by strengthening the tax administration and 
immediately created the National Tax Service (NTS). 
The implementation of the NTS relied on the following principles: 
 Full top down accountability 
 Full empowerment 
 Dramatic strengthening of enforcement capacity 
 Promoting voluntary compliance 
 Increasing legitimacy 
 
3.3.1 Full top down accountability  
The President made a strong public and personal commitment to meeting revenue 
mobilization objectives. He appointed Mr. Lee, the head of the Special 
Investigation Team whom had won his confidence, as the Commissioner of NTS. 
He was in the process making him fully accountable for his recommendations. 
President Park set targets based on the recommendations of the Special 
Investigation Team, and personally monitored results. One anecdotal evidence 
best illustrates how serious the level of commitment from the President was. 
Confident with the high potential of taxation, in 1966, President Park requested 
NTS to collect the tax revenues of KRW 70 billion (US$ 258 million), an amount 
30% greater than revenues in the previous year and which many thought to be over 
25 
 
ambitious. As a symbolic gesture of his resolve, President Park changed both his 
car plate number and telephone number for “700”16 (KIPF, 1997). Eventually, the 
Commissioner met the target. 
In addition, a chain of targets called the target revenue approach were set at all 
levels of the organization, from the Commissioner of NTS, to the heads of 
Regional Tax Offices, to the heads of District Tax Offices, to the division 
managers, down to the tax officers. These tax targets were broken down by 
geographical areas and tax categories.  Monetary incentives for incentives were 
introduced at all levels, under the form of bonuses and penalties for 
outperformance and underperformance 
The President made a public commitment to implement a zero tolerance policy for 
corruption. He explicitly pointed out that repairing the shame and blame of the 
past resulting from corruption was one of the main objectives of the creation of the 
NTS. A clear and strict rule established that whoever was involved in corruption 
would be fired and punished. This rule was enforced by a special anti-corruption 
team of 20 young, competitive and committed government officials, who were 
selected through the Senior Government Official Examination. To increase their 
visibility, they used to wear blue neckties and their slogan was an old Korean 
proverb saying “Treat gold as stone”. The fight against corruption also targeted 
bribers. In the first years of President Park in power, 24 leading business men were 
arrested for corruption
17
. 
3.3.2 Full empowerment 
Such stringent accountability system would not be successful without a 
commensurate empowerment. NTS benefited from full empowerment under two 
forms: political and financial. 
First, NTS benefited from the full political support by the President. The 
Commissioner, as a result of NTS‟s intensive investigations, faced high levels of 
pressure including from people with powerful political connections. But the 
President confirmed his indefectible support in many instances. 
Second, NTS was given resources to dramatically increase its size and capability. 
From 1966 to 1969, in 3 years, its budget increased by 71% in real terms, and its 
number of staff per inhabitant by 57%. Headcount went from 5500 to 9247, hence 
an increase by 3747 staff. The increase benefited both headquarters and local 
offices. As can see in the following, a substantial part of these resources were used 
to strengthen the administration‟s enforcement capacity. 
                                                          
16
 In Korea, there is a unit which is worth 0.1 billion. 70 billion is therefore equivalent to 700 of this unit. 
17
 See www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/park.htm 
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3.3.3 Dramatic strengthening of enforcement 
First, research functions were significantly strengthened. The functions of research 
are of course not limited to enforcement only. Research can be used to assess the 
impact of tax policies on equity, or on competitiveness for instance. We focus here 
on two research functions that are critical for enforcement: the assessment of 
revenue targets at a macro level and at the tax payer level. If properly conducted, 
these two research functions helps ensure targets are realistic and that the 
appropriate taxpayers are identified for investigation. NTS‟ research department 
extensively developed and used differential tax payer management systems. They 
consist in cross-checking all sources of information available – including sector 
level surveys, individual reports - of tax payers to categorize them into degrees of 
presumed compliance. High income earners categorized in the low degrees of 
presumed compliance would be targeted in priority for in-depth investigation. In 
addition, to secure highly qualified and fully committed tax officials, the National 
Tax Officials Training Institute was established in 1967. 
18
 In 1968, the institute 
had 88 staff. Information Technology was introduced in the very early days, in 
1970, to facilitate the processing of large amounts of information. NTS installed 
computer equipments and started to train in-house IT specialists. The strong IT 
support also enabled the introduction of the General Income Tax in 1975 and VAT 
in 1977, which involve heavy processing of income and transaction data (KIPF, 
1997). 
Second, NTS dramatically strengthened its capacity to conduct on-site 
investigations. Before the creation of NTS, the division responsible for on-site 
investigations within the Ministry of Finance was also responsible for other tasks, 
such as staff performance evaluations. It was not possible to carry out intensive tax 
investigations until NTS was created, with one investigation division at 
headquarters, and one investigation division in each field office. Investigations 
were sequenced in campaigns, each with its own focus. For instance, in 1966 the 
focus was on high income earners. In 1969, the focus changed to tax payers with a 
poor reporting record. Each campaign was carefully prepared by intensive data 
analysis and field surveys. 
Third, NTS heavily invested in decentralization. Between 1966 and 1968, the 
number of staff in district tax offices increased from 4906 to 8033, which 
represents a 64% increase. Research teams were created in each local tax office. 
Investigation teams were reinforced. At its creation, NTS had 4 Regional Tax 
Offices, 77 District Tax Offices. In its first two years, two new Regional Tax 
Offices and 14 District Tax Offices were added. 
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 It was then replaced by the National Tax University in 1980 (up to 2001) of which all graduates were employed 
by NTS. 
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Fourth, NTS enforced for small businesses a policy of full registration and 
simplified tax filing. One registration was required for each business location. 
This system lasted until 2008, when registration by business unit (with one 
consolidated balance sheet) became required for every business. Given the 
geographical nature of the full registration policy, local offices were in charge of 
enforcing it. Relevant regional or district tax offices were in charge of ensuring 
that all businesses were registered and of all the subsequent steps of the tax cycle, 
including collecting returns, payments, investigation. Full registration would not 
have yielded results had the small businesses been requested to submit tax returns 
based on bookkeeping and tax invoices. Instead, small businesses were simply 
required to pay tax calculated with the Standard Assessment Method. The 
Standard Assessment Method has been widely used in Korea for both income tax 
and sales taxes, later replaced by the VAT. The Standard Assessment Method 
estimates income and sales based on a series of objective and easy-to-observe 
measures. These can be for instance the number staff or machines. Ratios based on 
these measures and defined in a Standard assessment guide were then used by tax 
officials to determine the base for calculating taxes, either gross sales in the case 
of sales tax or gross income in the case of income tax. Tax payers were given the 
option to file full returns to determine their taxes if they felt they would pay less 
taxes (Choi, 1990).  
3.3.4 Promoting voluntary compliance 
Many efforts were directed towards encouraging voluntary and faithful tax 
submissions and registration of tax payers. As system of incentives was put in 
place to reward tax payers using transparent reporting methods and penalize those 
who were not. 
The “Green Report System”, established in 1965, was the Government‟s first 
effort to introduce the voluntary self assessment system. Once a taxpayer was 
found to be a green reporter as a result of faithful reporting, he was granted 
preferential treatments, such as tax deductions and installment payments. As an 
illustration, one of the criteria for becoming a green reporter was that field 
investigations would confirm earnings within +/-5% of the amount originally 
reported. However, some green reporters exploited the system to evade tax. As a 
result, from 1968, additional control measures were taken such as field 
investigations of green reporters.
19
  
NTS also made substantial efforts to encourage bookkeeping, as a way to increase 
compliance and accuracy of tax submissions. These efforts started in 1966 but 
were sustained on the long run, until today. The number of taxpayers using 
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 The Green Report System prevailed until the full introduction of voluntary self assessment system of income tax 
in 1995. 
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bookkeeping was 5163 in 1966. It was 219,000 in 1987 (33.2% of Global Income 
Taxpayers
20
) and 1,585,000 in 2007 (54.7% of Global Income Taxpayers).From 
1966, NTS held bookkeeping seminars for various types of businesses and 
conducted promotion campaigns through mass media to encourage bookkeeping. 
In 1972, Regional Tax Offices and District Tax Offices were given the 
responsibility to actively guide tax payers on double-entry bookkeeping and 
single-entry bookkeeping techniques. Since 1985, NTS established and managed a 
database of target taxpayers to be actively guided on bookkeeping. NTS created 
and distributed a simplified bookkeeping form in 1999. In 2004, tax rates were 
raised for negligent bookkeepers. Certificated Tax Attorneys (CTA) were trained 
to help taxpayers – mainly personal taxpayers and small businesses – produce 
compliant books, tax returns and payment claims. In 2007, a total of 7,260 CTAs 
were registered. 
3.3.5 Increasing legitimacy 
 
As enforcement was given a strong emphasis, it was critical at the same time to increase the 
legitimacy of taxation. The main measures taken to this end were as follows. 
The zero tolerance policy for corruption played an important role in increasing the legitimacy of 
taxation. As explained in chapter 3.3.1, the President publicly committed to eradicate corruption 
and set up very visible anti-corruption measures. This was important as tax payers had initially a 
negative image of tax officials because of widespread corruption. Interestingly, it is reported that 
as their image improved, the morale of the tax officials also improved. 
Public education and relations were also given an important role. In 1967, the Tax Day was set 
for March 3 every year, to promote a clean image of tax administration, create awareness of the 
central role of taxation in meeting the nation‟s development goals, and encourage self-
compliance. The event was chaired by President Park himself. Some of the interesting features of 
this tax day were the award of prizes for the best taxpayer and the involvement of national 
celebrities. The Tax Day still exists today
21
. In addition, as part of the public relation building 
effort, a Woman volleyball team sponsored by NTS was created. 
A greater emphasis was also put on improving the fairness of taxation. This involved improving 
the accuracy of the Standard Assessment Method (see chapter 3.3.3). The Standard Assessment 
Method was very basic at the beginning, and became gradually more sophisticated. At the 
creation of NTS, research teams in Regional Tax Offices undertook a revision of the ratios of the 
Standard assessment based on field surveys of reference businesses. Subsequently, in 1975, a 
multi-stakeholder group was set up to revise the guidelines, including tax administrators, tax 
specialists, representatives from the business community and financial institutions. In 1978, the 
method was adjusted based on geographic considerations and business cycles were taken into 
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 Global Income Tax was introduced in 1974. 
21
 In 2010, four show business Korean stars were appointed goodwill ambassadors. See 
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/06/01/2010060101043.html 
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account. In 1981, the standard ratios also reflected many other factors, such as the amount of 
capital, the type of facility, the business reputation and so on. 
3.4 1974-80: Strengthening equity and introducing the VAT 
 
The main features of the tax reforms of this period are the strengthening of equity as an objective 
of taxation, and the introduction of the VAT. 
3.4.1 Strengthening equity 
 
Following the 1973 oil crisis, the equity objective became more important. Korea experienced 
two years of lower growth: 7.2% in 1973 and 5.9% in 1975, as opposed to an average of 9.3% 
from 1963 to 1971. Growth came back to 10.6% in 1976, but inflation remained high (33, 26 and 
25% from 1974 to 1976, while it had remained below 18% since 1965), eroding the purchasing 
power of the poorest. 
As part of the effort to improve progressivity, and broaden the tax base among the wealthier, the 
Comprehensive Personal Income Tax was introduced. Until 1966, individual income was taxed at 
a flat rate by income categories. The first significant step toward global taxation was taken in the 
1967 tax reform, which introduced a progressive income tax based on comprehensive income. 
However, the comprehensive income was rather narrowly defined and the income tax system 
continued to be better approximated by flat taxes on various income categories, rather than by a 
progressive tax based on a broad income category. The definition of comprehensive income was 
broadened subsequently, in particular, by the tax reform of 1974 (effective 1975), which 
introduced the basic framework of the current individual income tax system (Choi, 2004).  Under 
the comprehensive income tax system, the number of tax brackets increased and the highest 
marginal tax rate was raised to 70 percent in 1975 from 50 percent in 1970.   
Table 1: The Structure of the Personal Income Tax 
 
In addition, the government granted generous tax reliefs to low wage earner. The level of tax-free 
personal deduction rose from 120,000 KW in 1970 to 780,000 KW in 1975, then to 2,380,000 
KW in 1980. Various deductions and credits were newly introduced. In addition to personal 
deductions, a wage earner was eligible for several other deductions, such as labor income 
deduction and deductions of educational and medical expenses. 
Finally, in 1974, the National Tax Tribunal was established as an independent agency to handle 
tax appeals under the new Basic Law of National Taxes. By protecting taxpayers‟ rights, the 
Tribunal contributed to improving both equity and legitimacy of taxation. 
Number of brackets Lower rate Highest rate
1970 9 7% 50%
1975 16 8% 70%
1980 17 6% 79%
Source: Choi (2004)
30 
 
3.4.2 Introducing the VAT 
The value-added tax (VAT) was introduced in Korea in 1977, after legislation was 
passed in late 1976. One purpose was to streamline the indirect tax system and its 
administration. Eight indirect taxes were consolidated into the VAT and a special 
consumption tax (SPC). 
 
The VAT was also adopted to introduce greater neutrality into the indirect tax 
system. The previous cascade turnover tax system had a number of resource 
misallocation and inefficiency disadvantages including: encouraging vertical 
integration and penalizing specialization, because the reduction of inter-firm sales 
reduced total tax liabilities.  
In addition, the VAT aimed at promoting exports and capital formation. In order to 
promote exports they were zero rated at the final stage of production under VAT, 
and rebates were available on taxes paid at earlier stages of production. This was 
in contrast to the previous system where cumulative taxes at “earlier stages of 
transactions in exported goods were either not rebatable or merely partly 
refundable”.22 Unlike most of the taxes it replaced, VAT does not burden capital 
goods because the consumption-type VAT provides full credit for the tax included 
in the purchase of capital goods
23
. As a result, VAT was expected to encourage 
capital formation. 
VAT was introduced and imposed at a single 10% rate on a wide range of goods 
and services, and collected through the invoice method. Thereby, each firm 
collected VAT on all sales, unless they were exempt, and were then entitled to a 
credit against its liability for taxes invoiced by its suppliers. Activities exempted 
from VAT included: exports (zero rated), daily necessities such as unprocessed 
foodstuffs and tap water, and financial services. One beneficial feature introduced 
with VAT was a change to a quarterly payment, which was easier for businesses to 
comply with than the more frequent two month tax period used under the old 
business sales tax system.  
A special consumption tax (SPC) was introduced simultaneously with VAT to 
inject some progressivity into the indirect tax system. The SPC imposed higher 
taxes on goods and services consumed disproportionately by high income 
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 Choi (2008) 
23
 The credit does not subsidise the purchase of capital goods, it simply eliminates the tax that had been imposed. 
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groups
24
. In addition, a number of exemptions were also used to reduce the 
regressivity of the VAT burden. 
Although Korea adopted a single 10% VAT rate, small businesses received special 
treatment, whereby if their annual sales were below a certain amount (KRW 24 
million when VAT was first introduced, or US$ 50,000) they were taxed at a rate 
of 2% of turnover. The special treatment for small business tended to be abused 
because small businesses were prone to under-report their turnover. Up to 1985, 
special taxpayers filed about 70-80% of all VAT returns with general tax payers 
filing the rest. However, although in the minority, general taxpayers contributed 
by far the majority of revenue (generally about 95% or more). Thus, the 
government has made continuous efforts to reduce special taxpayers by freezing 
criteria for special taxpayers. It has also tried to expose transactions as much as 
possible with various measures such as increasing the use of credit cards and 
introducing the cash receipts system (see Box 2). As result of these efforts, the 
proportion of special taxpayers decreased below 40% by 2006. 
 
Box 2 : Cash-Receipts – A recent innovation using technology and incentives to 
further broaden the tax base 
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 These included Televisions, refrigerators, pianos, passenger cars, coke, coffee, and - quite surprisingly given the 
intention of progressivity - sugar. 
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The Korean government expanded and retrained the tax administration personnel. 
The number of staff at NTS increased from 9,443 in 1976 to 11,442 in 1977. The 
new recruits did not begin working with VAT straight away and, instead, were put 
into other sections in order to release more experienced staff for VAT 
administration. This was complemented by staff handbooks prepared by NTS for 
officials working on VAT.  
The success of VAT largely depended on the degree of voluntary cooperation 
from the business community. In order to build this support and allow for business 
input, the Government set up committees, which included representatives from the 
Chamber of Commerce, Korean Tax Accountants Association and other relevant 
institutions. Despite these efforts, “insufficient communication between the 
government and taxpayer organizations and consumer groups damaged prospects 
for close cooperation. Unhappiness with the VAT on the part of the business 
Like many other countries across the globe, Korea has faced difficulties in accurately identifying tax revenues from 
small-sized businesses, especially since the Korean public tends to prefer paying in cash and fails to attach much 
significance to receipts. In 2000, credit-card purchases accounted for only 25.5 percent of total private spending. In 
a drive to levy standardized taxes on small businesses, the government has, since 2000, tried to stimulate public 
use of credit cards. It has expanded the number of businesses accepting credit cards, showered gifts on raffle 
winners drawn from the pool of credit-card users every month, and offered tax deductions for credit card 
purchases. As a result, credit card payments expanded to 41.7 percent of the nation's total private spending in 
2004, contributing to improving the transaction transparency and pinning down tax sources. Yet, cash transactions 
still make up 50 percent of total private expenditures.  As a way to address this problem, Korea has introduced the 
world's first-ever cash-receipt system in 2005.  
 
The cash-receipt system is a program through which cash purchases are tracked by a customer presenting a 
membership card for the system or a cell phone number, as opposed to getting a regular receipt, which is a record 
of sale for use by the buyer and the seller. When this cash receipt information is entered after a cash purchase, the 
information is sent straight to the National Tax Service. Thus, the government began the cash receipt system, 
through which cash incentives are offered to consumers to help track taxable transactions. The threshold for 
registering transactions stood at 5,000 Korean won ($3.75) until June 2008, when it changed to 1 Korean won 
beginning in July of that same year. The individual main taxpayer is able to receive a 20-percent deduction on 
his/her year-end tax settlement on the amount of total cash spending that exceeds 20 percent of one’s reported 
yearly income, up to a total of 5 million won. For businesses, a 1 percent rate of applicability is in place. As of 2007, 
the number of cash receipt issuances has surpassed the 700-million mark, while 1.37 million businesses are 
registered cash-receipt issuers.  
 
Source: Korean Government Official Website (Korea.net), NTS 
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community was evidenced by its last minute call to postpone the implementation 
of the VAT before the VAT became effective.”25 
A decentralized regional responsibility system was put in place. NTS has 
considered registration by operation important since VAT is in principle imposed 
per place of business. In this light, VAT tax administration – assessment, 
collection and investigation – has been conducted mainly under the responsibility 
of relevant regional or district tax offices. Initially, VAT tax officers were 
specified for each area where they were responsible for almost all taxation 
procedures including: business registration, tax returns and payment, investigation, 
and tax base development. In addition, the regional officers were responsible for 
reviewing the contents of tax reports and providing guidance before they accepted 
the reports to ensure faithful tax compliance and early settlement of VAT. 
From its first year of introduction, a computerized system was put in place to 
cross-check seller and purchaser invoices of general tax payers. In the last half of 
1977, 7.2% of all invoices did not match, but in 1982, the proportion of 
mismatches decreased to 1.4%. Improved compliance enabled the administration 
to progressively decrease the number tax invoices processed.
26
 
3.5 1980-today: Liberalization 
 
From the 80s, in keeping with a policy of structural adjustment and 
liberalization, tax reform activities slowed down. 
The focus was on reducing the range of tax incentives and broadening the tax 
base to improve allocation efficiency. In 1982, the liberal tax privileges of 
strategic industries were almost completely removed. The 1988 tax reform 
significantly reduced remaining exemptions. This effort has continued since, with 
for instance the 1998 reform which removed VAT exemptions on professional 
services such as lawyers and accountants. In 1993, the real-name system of 
financial transactions included tax on capital income into the individual tax base, 
completing the efforts of the 1976 comprehensive income tax to improve 
progressivity. 
In addition, a number of ad-hoc revisions of tax policies were introduced to 
address new issues as they arose. 
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To curb real estate speculation the excessive land holding tax in the 1986 
significantly increased land related taxes. These included taxes on capital gains 
and land property. These measures have often been viewed as ineffective, in part 
due to their not being comprehensive and hence not the creating enough incentives 
for the wealthiest to reduce speculation
27
. 
Following the 1997 Asian crisis, in became critical to rapidly restructure 
inefficient chaebols. Tax incentives were granted to transaction-related taxes such 
as capital gains tax, acquisition tax, and registration tax. For instance, corporate 
assets after mergers and acquisitions were exempted from registration tax and made 
eligible from corporate income tax until the alienation of the revalued assets.  
As part of the efforts to reverse the capital flight prompted by the crisis, the 
Foreign Investment Promotion Law (FIPL) was enacted in 1998. For instance, 
foreign businesses and investors who made advanced technology Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in Korea were eligible for exemption from individual and 
corporate income taxes for the first seven years, and a 50% reduction for each of the 
following three years. 
One of the more recent challenges faced by Korea has been population ageing. 
The National Pension Fund was created in 1988 to help address this issue. 
Annual contributions have grown to 7% of GDP today (see 
Figure 3). According to OECD simulations, Korea‟s public spending on health and 
long-term care might rise by 6 to 9 percentage points of GDP by 2050, the largest 
increase in the OECD area. The OECD recommends taking early action to increase 
revenue so as to limit the long-term cost from the higher fiscal burden
28
. 
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4 Select lessons from an EAC perspective  
 
While the previous section provided a narrative of Korea‟s tax reforms during its 
takeoff phase, this section analyses two lessons of particular relevance to EAC 
member countries. First, Korea achieved faster results by focusing its tax policies 
on a few priorities fully aligned with its national development strategy. Second, 
Korea broadened its tax base by making its tax administration both empowered 
and accountable. One chapter is dedicated to each lesson, analyzing the results 
achieved and some of the key measures which contributed to them. 
4.1 Focusing on few priorities aligned with the national development 
strategy 
 
Like EAC member countries today, Korea during its takeoff was challenged by 
multiple and conflicting tax objectives. These included increasing revenues, 
allocating resources efficiently, stimulating savings and investment, providing 
safety nets and promoting social equity. However, stimulating investments or 
providing safety nets for instance involve exemptions, which unfortunately 
conflicts with objectives of allocating resources neutrally and broadening the tax 
base. 
Korea focused its tax policies on a few priorities fully aligned with its national 
development strategy. In the 60s and 70s, Korea‟s national strategy was on the one 
hand to rapidly achieve fiscal balance at a low level of expenditure, and on the 
other hand to promote growth through an infant industry policy. To this end, 
Korea pursued tax policies focused on increasing revenues from a very low base 
up to a level still low by international standards, broadening the tax base, and 
providing incentives to strategic sectors.  
The following illustrates the alignment of Korea‟s tax policies with three specific 
national strategies: small balanced budget, active export promotion, followed by 
liberalization. The last chapter of this section concludes by stressing the 
importance of an integrated economic planning process to bring the benefits of 
prioritization and alignment with the national strategy. 
4.1.1 Small and balanced government budget 
 
36 
 
Figure 3: Government budget and growth
29
 
 
 
During the takeoff period and after 1980, government budget was small by 
international standards, with tax revenues and expenditures below 16% (see Figure 
3). Central tax revenues of 16% of GDP are in the same range as in the EAC today 
and much lower than in South Africa. Average tax revenues in 2008 in the EAC 
stood at 16%
30
, ranging from 12% (Uganda) to 19% (Kenya). Tax revenue was 
28% in South Africa in 2008. In addition, a study by Bahl, Kim and Park (1986) 
compares Korea‟s expenditure to 31 other developing countries from 1973 to 
1976, making adjustments to ensure comparability. It finds that the average 
expenditure share of GDP in Korea was significantly lower than in the comparator 
countries (15.9% vs. 28.4% including military expenditures, and 11% vs. 17.4% 
for nondefense expenditure). 
One of the main rationales for a small government budget was to rapidly achieve 
fiscal balance. Achieving fiscal balance was primarily the result of an anticipated 
decline in foreign aid. Following the Korean War, the USA were the main 
provider of aid to Korea. Aid accounted for up to 45% of Government revenues 
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 The figure excludes local government revenues. It shows „central tax revenues‟, but also „total central revenues 
including tax revenues, proceeds from divestitures, investment income and grants‟, and „total central revenues 
including the former and social contributions‟. Social contributions are mostly constituted of the National Pension 
Fund (NPF), which is the largest public fund in Korea. It was established in 1988 and has been largely accumulating 
reserves since rather than making payments. As revenues including social contributions were not available every 
year, they are indicated in dots. The main point for this case study is that in the 60s and 70s, before the creation of 
the NPF, total central revenues were much lower than the EAC average and much lower than in South Africa. In 
addition, after the creation of the NPF, total revenues including social contributions, remained below 26% up to 
today, which is much lower than the OECD average of 37% today. This illustrates that Korea has continued its 
policy of low public expenditure. 
30
 GDP-weighted average, calculated by the authors from IMF staff reports. 
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and 70% of imports. In 1957, the USA unexpectedly announced that they were 
phasing out their financial aid, which effectively started to decline from 1958. 
From that year, addressing the resulting twin deficit became a central objective of 
government policies. The government reduced expenditure from around 20% of 
GDP in the early 60s to 16% in the 70s, while tax revenues increased from 9% to 
15%. Fiscal balance has been consistently achieved from the mid-70s. 
The other important rationale was to encourage private investment and growth. 
Korea‟s development was fundamentally private-sector led. Though the 
Government very actively worked with the private sector to provide a conducive 
environment to achieve competitiveness, including temporary protection, targeted 
subsidies, adequate human resources, infrastructure, support in international sales 
and marketing…, production was driven by the private sector. This policy required 
maximizing savings available to the private sector, lowering corporate taxes to the 
extent possible, and encouraging private consumption. A small government budget 
was seen as important to achieving these objectives. 
Accordingly, Korea‟s taxation during the takeoff phase aimed at contributing to 
achieving fiscal balance while maintaining a low tax burden. Fiscal balance was 
indeed achieved by both reducing expenditures and increasing revenues. In 
addition, tax revenue was capped at a low level, below 16% of GDP, which along 
with a broad tax base (see Chapter 4.2.1), contributed to making low tax rates 
possible. For example, VAT was à 10%, against 16 to 20% in the EAC. Korea‟s 
VAT rate is among the lowest in the world, while it contributed substantially to 
total revenues, at about a fourth of central tax revenues (25% in 1980). 
Furthermore, Corporate Income Tax for small and medium enterprises was also 
low, at 15 and 25% for listed and non-listed small enterprises respectively
31
, 
against 30 to 35% in EAC countries. 
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Corporate income tax rates in 1968 for listed and non-listed companies
Taxable income (KRW) Taxable income (2000 PPP US$) (1)
between and between and Listed Non listed
Small enterprise (2) 0 1,000,000 0 41,775 15% 25%
Medium enterprise (2) 1,000,000 5,000,000 41,775 208,874 20% 35%
Large enterprise (2) 5,000,000 208,874 25% 45%
Source: K. Choi, (2004), Tax policy and tax system in Korea , Chapter 1 table I-8, KIPF 
Notes: (1) Conversion by the author, based on WDI PPP exchange rates and CPI
(2) Qualification of the taxale income bracket by the author
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Figure 4: Savings and investment in Korea 
 
 
The small balanced budget strategy, including its tax component, contributed to a 
dramatic increase in domestic private savings and investment (Figure 4). Savings 
started at 10% of GDP in 1960 and increased dramatically to 30% in 25 years. 
Investment follows a similar progression, but remains greater than savings during 
the entire takeoff period. The gap between investment and domestic savings was 
mainly filled by private foreign loans, many benefitting from Government 
guarantee. Korea sustained an average savings ratio of 30% from the 80‟s, which 
is high compared to savings ratios in both the EAC (savings stood at 10% in 2008 
in Kenya and 18% in South Africa) and advanced economies (Germany and the 
USA in 2005 had domestic savings ratios of 22 and 14% respectively).
32
 
4.1.2 From active export promotion to liberalization 
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 It is worth noting that following the decline in aid to zero in 1974, foreign capital played a significant role in the 
financing of Korea‟s development, but second to domestic savings. Foreign capital has been dominated by foreign 
private loans, which hovered around 7%. FDI was insignificant until 1997, when Korea opened its stock exchange to 
foreign investors in an attempt to reverse the capital flight triggered by the financial crisis. FDI has remained below 
2%. 
1962-1980
Development policy
Infant industry
Tax objectives
Increasing tax revenues 
and promoting growth
1980-present
Development policy
Liberalization
Tax objective
Tax neutrality                 
and equity
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The sequencing and nature of Korea‟s tax strategies closely mirrored the 
sequencing of its development policies. As explained in chapter 2.1, from 1962 to 
1980 Korea conducted an export-oriented infant industry policy, providing 
temporary protection and privileged support to selected industries. Consequently, 
during this period, one objective of tax policies was to promote the growth of 
these selected industries. Tax incentives were extensively used, as explained in 
chapter 3.2. Similarly, from 1980, as the national policy moved to liberalization, 
tax shifted to eliminating exemptions to achieve effective market-based resource 
allocation. 
A number of studies demonstrated that tax incentives did contribute to the national 
strategy by increasing the financial attractiveness of investment in the priority 
sectors, but less than credit-based incentives. Kwack (1992) finds that over the 
period of 1966 to 1985, up to 37% of total investments were given back to key and 
strategic industries under the form of tax privileges. According to KIPF (2004), in 
1970, tax exemptions amounted to 30% of total tax revenue. However, Kwack 
(1984), using a modified version of the effective marginal tax rate formula 
developed by D. W. Jorgenson and M. A. Sullivan finds that effective marginal 
corporate income tax rates were still high and that benefits from tax privileges 
were effectively lower than one would have expected
33
. The high levels of 
effective marginal tax rates are the result of high inflation and the depreciation 
regime based on historical costs. Finally, Kwack (1988) found that tax incentives 
played a role in reducing the cost of capital for export companies, but this impact 
was much smaller than the credit-based incentives provided by the government. 
For instance, in 1966, tax incentives and direct financial incentives reduced the 
cost of capital from 63% to 54% and 42% respectively. 
4.1.3 Benefits of an integrated economic planning process 
 
Korea could fully align its tax policies with the national strategy because it 
formulated both as part of integrated five-year economic development plans. The 
plans - Korea‟s central development planning tool - were developed by a small 
team called the Economic Planning Board, established in 1961 by President Park 
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 For instance, in 1975, when the benefits were the largest, two firms producing machinery, electrical and electric 
equipment, one qualifying for tax privileges and the other one not, would pay an effective marginal tax rate of 53.2 
and 38.7% respectively. The marginal effective tax rate on capital income is the expected pretax rate of return minus 
the expected after-tax rate of return on a new marginal investment, divided by the pretax rate of return. It therefore 
measures a reduction on rates of return. The marginal effective tax rates and the tax rate are therefore different 
concepts and cannot be compared directly. 
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and directly reporting to him. The plans encompassed all policies, including 
taxation, focusing them towards a few common objectives (see chapter 2.1 for 
more details). 
The impact of tax policies was enhanced because they were complementing other 
policies. The list of complementary non-tax measures during the takeoff period is 
long and included the following: the won was devaluated in 1964 by 50%, official 
interest rates from deposits were raised dramatically in the mid-60‟s to encourage 
savings, credit-based subsidies were provided to key industries, preferential access 
to imports in the form of quotas was given to companies with strong export 
performance, free trade zones were established with streamlined customs 
procedures, public investments focused on export infrastructure such as ports, 
systems of centralized wholesale purchase of imported inputs were put in place to 
increase the bargaining power of export SMEs, high potential SMEs were selected 
for special support including capacity building and close government performance 
monitoring, ambassadors were given export sales targets and held accountable for 
meeting them. In the social space, special education programs were put in place to 
provide priority industries with the adequate skills, and active family planning 
brought the total fertility rate from 6.0 to 1.6 over the period 1960-87, thus 
facilitating capital accumulation (including human capital)
34
. 
Furthermore, the trade-offs resulting from a strong focus in the tax area could be 
made up by non tax policies, illustrating that prioritization and sequencing offer a 
solution to overcome conficting tax objectives. The objectives of increasing 
revenues and providing incentives for savings and investment in target sectors 
were given higher priority than others such as neutrality and equity
35
. However, 
these trade-offs were largely made up by the outcome of other policies. These, 
rather than direct revenue transfers, focused on providing pro-poor opportunities. 
They included equity-oriented expenditure programs - such as the New Village 
Movement which provided performance based subsidies to villages to improve 
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 From 1966, the average population growth was more than two times higher in Uganda and Kenya than in Korea 
(source: WDI and calculations by the authors). Family planning policy in the 60s promoted small families. It 
contained communications campaigns including use of contraceptives. It was recognized internationally as being 
successful and was acclaimed by the United National Fund for Population Activities. A low population growth is 
likely to have played a critical role in making rapid capital accumulation possible in Korea. It also helped limit the 
burden on the government for the provision of public services. 
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 Social spending in Korea has been relatively low, below 3% until 1990. Though it has continuously grown since 
to reach 7% of GDP today, an OECD study observes that Korea still ranks last among OECD countries on that 
dimension (Randall, 2009). 
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productivity
36
, a thorough land redistribution program between 1945 and 1950, 
and education policies that promote upward social mobility
37
. These policies, 
combined with decades of sustained growth, enabled Korea to perform well on 
equity, as evidenced by Korea‟s Gini coefficient of 32 in 2008 - equal to the 
European average. 
4.2 Empowering and holding accountable the tax administration 
 
Korea broadened its tax base by making its tax administration both empowered and 
accountable. The most visible result of creating the NTS was the subsequent rapid 
increase in central tax revenues, from 9% of GDP in 1966 to 15% in 1980 (7 to 11% 
for domestic taxes, the remaining coming from customs taxes, under the 
responsibility of a separate agency). Most EAC member countries have achieved 
revenue levels in the same range, over similar periods of time. However, at similar 
levels of revenues, Korea seems to have achieved a broader tax base. In the 
following we present evidence of Korea‟s relatively broader tax base and analyze 
the links between this performance and two distinctive features of Korea‟s tax 
system: a tax administration benefitting from adequate resources and high level 
political support, and at the same time fully accountable for results. 
4.2.1 Evidence of a broadened tax base 
 
A number of macro-level indicators show that Korea succeeded in broadening its 
tax base. Micro-level indicators for the 60s and 70s, such as measures of tax 
productivity by type of tax cannot be calculated because of the lack of detailed 
data on different tax base (personal and corporate income in particular). 
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 The initiative (Saemaeul Undong) was launched 1970 by South Korean president Park Chung Hee. It sought to 
rectify the growing disparity of the standard of living between the nation's urban centers and the small villages. It 
was performance-based and concentrated on building up rural infrastructure. It was hailed as a great success in the 
1970s, contributing to a rapid increase in rice productivity from 2.5 to 4.5 ton/ha (among the highest in the world, on 
par with Japan). The movement lost momentum during the 1980s as it was plagued by several challenges, including 
rent capture (Kim, 2010). 
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Box 3 : Drivers of tax revenue increase: number of taxpayers and size of the 
individual tax base 
 
 
First, tax revenues increased significantly, while tax rates and collection efficiency 
did not, indicating that a broadening of the tax base was a key driver. Most of the 
revenue increase occurred in the four years following the creation of the NTS, 
from 1966 to 1969, with an average annual real growth rate of 25%. Our focus is 
therefore on these four years. Furthermore, the top four domestic taxes were 
individual income tax, personal income tax, business tax and commodity tax (both 
indirect taxes), accounted for 43% of total tax revenues in 1966, and grew at an 
annual real rate of 27%. We focus our analysis on these taxes. 
Depending on the type of taxes, the growth in revenues was driven by either an 
increase in the number of taxpayers, or a broadening of the individual tax base. 
First, there is no indication that collection efficiency improved over the same 
period – in fact it might have slightly deteriorated, as arrears (ratio of arrears to tax 
collection) increased from 8% to 10% from 1966 to 1970. Second, Table 2 shows 
that changes in average tax rates were marginal, between -3 and +7%. As a result, 
the increase in revenues must be explained by a broadening of the tax base under 
the form of an increase in the number of taxpayers or broadening of the individual 
tax base (see  
 
Three factors can individually drive an increase in tax revenues, all other things being equal: increase in tax rates, 
broadening of the tax base, or improvement in collection (in the narrow sense of effectively collection of taxes as 
they have been calculated). Of course, these factors can move in divergent directions and together result in either 
an increase or decrease in revenues. For instance, a broadening of the tax base along with a decrease in tax rates 
can still result in an overall increase in tax revenues. 
 
The tax base is what is taxed. Its broadening can therefore take essentially two forms: 
 increase in the number of taxpayers, following an improvement in the identification and registration of 
tax payers, a reduction of exemptions 
 increase in the individual tax base - by tax payers -, following a reduction in evasion, a greater accuracy of 
the estimate of the individual tax base – either through enforcement or voluntary compliance, an 
increase in sales and income of individual tax payers 
 
This framework is simplified as it does not explicitly show the feedback effects that link the different parameters. 
For instance, a decrease in tax rates can contribute to increasing the individual tax base.  
Increase in tax 
rates
•Policy
Broadening of 
tax base
•Administration
Improvement 
in collection
•Administration
Increase in tax 
revenues
•Performance
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Box 3). 
 
Table 2: Domestic taxes: drivers of revenue growth 
 
In the case of personal income tax, the increase of the number of taxpayers was 
one of the important drivers of the broadening of the tax base. Personal income tax 
revenue is composed of many different forms of personal income tax: labour 
income tax (employees), individual business income tax (small business owners), 
real estate income tax, interest income tax… Table 2 shows the growth in the 
number of tax payers for one of these components: the individual business income 
tax. It grew by a staggering 32% on average from 1966 to 1969
38
. 
For both corporate income tax and indirect taxes, increase in the individual tax 
base was the main driver of the broadening of the tax base. Indeed, Table 2 shows 
that the number of tax payers for corporate income tax and business sales tax 
increased by 4 and 6% respectively, which is largely insufficient to explain a 
growth rate of 26 and 27% respectively. 
The second macro-level indicator which shows that Korea succeeded in 
broadening its tax base is its high level of VAT gross compliance ratio
39
. Because 
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 Data on the number of tax payers for all components of the personal income tax is not available. A detailed 
analysis of changes in the number of tax payers by category of personal income tax revealed that there were 
significant multiple counts of the same tax payers for several categories of personal income tax. For instance, one 
labor income tax payer was counted for each tax bracket. Therefore, for many personal income tax categories, it was 
difficult to determine with certainty whether an increase in the number of tax payers resulted from an increase in the 
number of tax brackets or an actual increase in the number of tax payers. The figure for individual business income 
tax was presented however because the problem did not apply to this tax category. Indeed, the number of tax 
brackets increased from 5 to 6 over 1966-1969, which could explain an artificial increase in the number of tax 
payers of 7% per year (20% averaged over three years), far below the 32% achieved. 
39
 Ratio of VAT revenue to consumption – as a proxy for the taxable base of VAT- , divided by the standard tax rate. 
Domestic taxes: increase in revenu  an  dri rs of growth
Average early average growth rate, from 1966 to 1969
Real revenue (1) Average tax rate (2)Nb. of taxpayers (1)
Personal income tax (3) 31% 7% 32%
Corporate income tax 26% -3% 4%
Business sales tax 27% 0% 6%
Commodity tax 24% 0% 10%
Source: NTS, calculations by the authors
Notes: (1) Arythmetic average of annual growth rates
(2) the average tax rate is the average of the tax rates in each bracket. 
The correct average rate should be weighted by the tax base in each bracket.
 As the tax base by tax bracket was not available, the average was used as a proxy.
(3) The change in number oftax payers is shown only for the individual business income tax
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of its flat rate across almost all goods and services, VAT efficiency is one of the 
easiest and most accurate efficiency measurements. Because VAT was put in place 
in 1977 at the end of the reform period examined in this study and its 
implementation relied on the systems that were developed from 1966 to 1976, 
measuring the efficiency of VAT at its inception is an indirect way to assess the 
performance of the reforms that prepared its implementation.  Figure 5 shows 
Korea‟s Gross Compliance Ratio (GCR) for selected years in Korea, Uganda and 
Kenya. Firstly, Korea has had a high GCR, increasing from about 55% in 1978 to 
almost 80% today. This is high by international standards. Aizenman and Jinjarak 
(2005) show that for a panel of 44 countries (including low, middle and high 
income)
40
, sampled during the period 1970-1999, the GCR of VAT ranges from 
“2.4% in Belarus… to 45.2% in Finland”. Secondly, the Korean GCR is 
consistently higher than those for Uganda and Kenya, even when comparing 
Korea in 1978 with the two East African countries in 2008. The initial version 
included both C-efficiency and efficiency ratio.  
Figure 5: VAT Gross Compliance Ratios– Korea, Uganda and Kenya 
 
Korea‟s high efficiency in collecting indirect taxes contributed largely to the 
overall efficiency of the tax system. Indeed, indirect taxes, at 45 to 50% of 
revenues in the 60s and 70s, were by far the largest tax revenue contributors. 
4.2.2 Empowerment 
 
Though a combination of factors probably explains Korea‟s ability to broaden its 
tax base, we present one distinctive feature which played an important role: the 
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empowerment of the tax administration. Two aspects of the high level of 
empowerment of NTS are the President‟s personal support to the Commissioner 
against external pressure, and the relatively large size of Korea‟s tax 
administration. 
 The tax administration was protected by top government officials from 
interference in its operations. For instance, as explained in chapter 3.3.2, the 
President personally supported the Commissioner against external pressure. In 
contrast, many examples can be found in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) of 
Commissioners or high ranking officials being changed as a result of external 
influence. For instance, following the creation of the Kenya Revenue Authority, 
the first two Commissioner Generals did not complete their three year terms. In 
Uganda in 1998, as a result of distrust between Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) 
and the political leadership, MoFPED curtailed the mandate and administrative 
autonomy of URA‟s Board with an explicit cue from the President41. 
Figure 6: VAT performance and size of the tax administration 
 
In addition, Korea‟s tax administration in 1977 had a higher number of staff 
members than EAC administrations by several orders of magnitude. Korea had 
about 5 times as much staff per population as the EAC on average today
42
, and up 
to 10 times more than Uganda.  
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 Excluding Burundi, for which data was not available. 
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Analyzing the breadth of the tax base against the size of the administration 
suggests that EAC tax administrations may be inadequately resourced. Figure 6 
plots VAT GCR against the size of the tax administration (as explained in the 
previous chapter, for lack of better measures available, VAT GCR is used as a 
proxy for measuring the breadth of the tax base). In this sample no tax 
administration has achieved the VAT performance of Korea and South Africa with 
significantly less staff. This does not mean that increasing the size of the 
administration is sufficient to achieve a broader tax base, but does indicate that 
more adequate resources may be necessary to do so
43
. 
 
Table 3: Size of revenue authorities and performance (2008 values unless specified 
otherwise) 
 
 
Using the operating-cost-to-revenue ratio as benchmark for the size of a tax 
administration is misleading and can result in undersized administrations. This 
ratio is often quoted to justify limiting the size of EAC tax administrations. For 
instance, an operating cost ratio of 3% in Uganda (see Table 3: Size of revenue 
authorities and performance (2008 values unless specified otherwise)) would be 
considered high though to indicate that Uganda‟s tax administration is too large. 
This is incorrect as it measures size only against one dimension of performance: 
revenue-to-GDP. It leaves out another critical dimension of performance: the 
breadth of the tax base, also rightly called efficiency of a tax. In the case of Korea, 
generating high levels of revenues was not an objective, in line with Korea‟s small 
government budget strategy. Revenue targets and tax rates were intentionally low, 
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 One should exert caution when directly comparing sizes of tax administrations across countries and time periods. 
For instance, a country with a larger population or economy should normally be able to achieve better economies of 
scale. In addition, information technologies which were not available in the 60s are now widely used and 
contributing to increased efficiency. In practice, adjusting for differences in these factors is difficult. However, in 
this specific case, the assumption of the authors is that the effect of adjustments would be marginal compared to the 
very large size difference between administrations in the EAC on the one hand, and South Africa and Korea on the 
other hand. 
Korea, 1966 Korea, 1969 Korea, 1977 Korea, 2008 Kenya Uganda Tanzania Rwanda South Africa
Staff to 1000 population (excl. customs) (1) 0.19 0.30 0.34 0.41 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.29
Operating cost to revenue (2) 2.1% 1.8% 1.5% 1.1% 1.6% 3.0% 2.8% 2.7% 1.0%
Domestic tax revenues 7% 10% 10% 15% 19% 12% 15% 14% 28%
VAT gross compliance ratio N/A N/A 55% 86% 41% 27% 27% 30% 87%
Source: Fiscal reform.net, TRA, KRA, URA, SRA reports and IMF staff reports, NTS, WDI, calculations by the authors
Notes: (1) Because Korea's revenue authority does not collect customs taxes, in other coutnries adjusted staff numbers 
were calculated by multiplying the total staff number by the share of non customs taxes in tax revenues. This provides an estimation
 of staff number for a similar organization focusing on domestic taxes only.
(2) Only domestic costs and revenues in Korea, total costs and revenues in other countries, inlcuding customs
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automatically resulting in a relatively low average operating-cost-to-revenue 
efficiency ratio, at 1.8% in 1969. However, this low ratio, reflecting high level of 
operational resources, could be justified by a good performance on broadening the 
tax base. It is therefore incorrect to conclude from a high operating-cost-to-
revenue ratio that resources are inefficiently used and that resources should be 
reduced. 
4.2.3 Accountability and empowerment, two sides of the coin 
 
As explained in chapter 3.3.1, accountability took three main forms: close 
performance monitoring at the highest level, target revenue approach and 
incentives for performance, and a zero-tolerance for corruption. Most countries 
implement these forms of accountability mechanism to some extent. However, the 
fact that President Park personally monitored the performance of NTS sets Korea 
apart and illustrates the commitment for results at the highest level. 
Empowerment and accountability should be viewed as two sides of the same coin. 
Providing large resources and protection from interference at the operational level 
could have resulted in efficiencies without a tight supervision. Reciprocally, the 
high pressure to deliver would have been fruitless without adequate means.  
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5 Conclusion 
 
Tax reforms significantly contributed to Korea’s successful development. They helped Korea 
rapidly achieve fiscal balance and promoted savings and investment through incentives. However, 
one of the key reasons for the success of Korea‟s tax reforms was their full integration into the 
broader national strategy. Indeed, fiscal balance was only achieved because expenditure was 
reduced, and tax incentives for investment only had an impact because they complemented credit- 
based incentives. 
This study found two lessons of particular relevance to EAC member countries. First, Korea 
achieved faster results by focusing its tax policies on a few priorities fully aligned with its national 
development strategy. Second, Korea broadened its tax base by both making the tax administration 
both empowered and accountable. 
One useful way to read these lessons is that part of Korea’s success can be explained by a 
strong emphasis on implementation, beyond strategy and policies. In fact many of Korea‟s 
policies and strategies have been adopted in the EAC in one form or another. These include for 
example incentives to promote investment, simplified tax filings for small enterprises, special 
initiatives for large payers… Korea therefore stands out for its emphasis on implementation rather 
than the nature of its policies. Indeed, focused and coherent strategies are a prerequisite for solid 
implementation. Empowered and accountable execution agencies are critical for effective delivery. 
Implementation plays a central role in Korea‟s experience in general, beyond the field of taxation. As 
an illustration, it is said that President Park allocated 20% of his time to decision-making, and 80% 
to implementation. As a result, over his 18 years of tenure, he spent 119 days a year across all parts 
of Korea, demonstrating his commitment for results, monitoring them and listening to practical 
feedback from the ground. 
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Annex I - Chronology: politics, economy and taxation 
 
 
Year 5YP Politics Economics Taxation
1948 Republic of Korea proclaimed (split 
into North and South Korea)
Creation of modern tax system
Major tax acts: income, corporation, liquor (and later inheritance and 
commodity)
1950 Invasion by North Korea War tax acts
Land and temporary tax revenue expansion acts
Land income tax replaces general income tax
1953 End of Korean war Reestablishment of civil tax regime
based on Wald's report
abolishment of war taxes
textile tax absorbed in commodity tax
license tax transfered to local governments
progressive income tax introduced
corporate tax based on estimated results introduced
1958 Three new taxes to increase revenues
Education tax (surtax on personal income)
Asset revaluation tax
Foreign exchange tax (targeting black market)
1960 Tax reform of the Democratic Party
Direct taxes reduced, indirect taxes raised
Introduction of tax exemptions for export and investment
1961 Glorious revolution - Park Chung Hee 
president
Economic Planning Board established
First devaluation
Special measures to curb tax evasion
Temporary emasure for tax collection
Special measure for tax evasion punishment
Revision of income, coroporation and business tax
New accounting system
General tax administration reform
Tax administration simplified
Regional tax offices reorganized
Tax officials screened
1962 First 5Y EDP: export manufacturing First comprehensive tax reform
Focus: administrative efficiency, growth
Tax given a central role for growth promotion
Reduction of number of taxes (38 to 28, 15 national taxes)
10 tax laws revised
Adjustment law for national and local tax
National tax appellate application law
1963 Foreign exchange tax abolished
1964 Second devaluation
1965 Normalisation of relationships with 
Japan
Beginning of international borrowing 
(including from Japan)
1966 Office of National Tax Administration created
target revenue approach adopted
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1967 Second comprehensive tax reform
Focus: growth, equity, administratieve efficiency
Substantial expansion of tax exemptions for manufacturing export
Reduction of taxes on capital gains from listed companies, and interests on 
bank deposits to promote savings
Liquor and commodity tax raised to discourage consumption of target goods
Investment credit and special depreciation on strategic industries to support 
investment
19 tax laws revised
Real estate speculation control tax introduced
Partial global income tax introduced
Higher bracket income and inheritance tax rates raised, lower browkets 
lowered for equity
1968 Measure to improve compliance
tax penalties raised, tax credits for voluntary returns increased, acceleration 
of return of overpaid taxes, improvement of the tax appeal system
1969 Revision of laws to improve voluntary submission (6 laws including 
corporate)
1970
1971 New Community policy (high grain 
prices). Before that, low grain prices 
were imposed.
Third comprehensive tax reform
expansion of corporate and investment tax incentives. Special tax 
exemptions and depreciation up to 80% for strategic industries, includign 
small and medium size businesses
1972 Third 5Y EDP: diversification
heavy and chemical industries, steel, 
machinery, shipbuilding, electronics, 
oil refining
Emergency decree for economic stability and growth
generous investment tax credits
abolished revenue sharing scheme for local governments
1973 First oil crisis
Followed by a sustained inflation in 
the 70's
1974 January - Emergency tax reforms
Focus: equity (protect poor from inflation)
Tax relief for low wage earners
December - Fourth Comprehensive tax reform
Focus: equity and growth
Comprehensive global income tax introduced
Capital gains tax replaces real estate speculation control tax
Tax exemptions for strategic industries (shipbuilding, machinery): choice 
given between one of three: direct exemption, investment credit, special 
depreciation
Business tax rates raised to prepare for VAT
Withholding tax extended to manufacturers and wholesalers
Reporting system reinforced
Basic law for National Taxes: improve tawx payers rights by prohibiting 
retroactive taxation, introducing assessment based on bookkeeping and 
establishement of the Tax tribual as a special independant agency
1975 defense tax law introduced
1976 Fifth comprehensive tax reform
VAT and special excise tax introduced
8 of 11 indirect tax laws revised
entertainment and food tax become national
registration tax becomes local
1977
1978
1979 Recession following stabilisation 
measures to fight inflation
1979 Park Chung Hee assassinated, 
followed by continued military rule
Second oil crisis
Major shift towards liberalization
1980 Reforms to reduce exemptions
1987 First democratic elections
1989 Global landholding tax introduced, to curb land speculation
1990 Defense tax law abolished
1996 Global income tax includes financial revenues
Self-assessment introduced
Corporate tax reduced to improve competitiveness
1997 East-Asian financial crisis Tax reforms to facilitate restructuring and attract FDI
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